URGES REPAIRING LONG NEGLECT OF MERCHANT MARINE

QUICK FIRING GUN SCREENED BY BUSHES QUEEN'S ROYAL WEST SURREY REG'T.

AMMUNITION WAGON HEAVY FIELD ARTILLERY ALDERSHOT - MEN WALK AT SIDE ALL OVER SIX FEET

Cataclysmic Struggle in Europe Emphasizes America's Need of Craft to Carry Traffic Over the Seven Seas and of Proportionately Larger Navy.



By WILLIS FLETCHER JOHNSON.

AS it was in the beginning of our national life, so it is now. A war in which we have no direct interest, among powers with all of which we have been and desire to remain friendly, has a most seriously disturbing effect upon our commercial relations. It is not likely, we might say that it is not possible, that the disturbance will be carried as far or be as malign as in Napoleonic times. There will be no Milan and Berlin decrees and orders in council. There will be no occasion for us to take up arms to maintain our rights. There will be no embargo. But, in other respects, this occasion may prove to be as important as that other.

It blazes before the nation's eyes, in characters that burn and that should convince, three tremendous facts:

The need of an American navy commensurate with the magnitude and the extended distribution of our commercial and social interests;

The need of a mercantile marine adequate to the transportation of our own passengers, mails and merchandise; and

The unique and unrivalled opportunity which is now not merely presented but actually urged and forced upon us to repair in a single enterprising act the neglect of a generation, and to make the American flag first in peace as well as in war on all the high seas of the world.

The first act of the war, actually anticipating the formal declaration of belligerence, was the large suspension of Atlantic traffic by several of the chief European powers. The instantaneous result was world-wide in its distressing effects, but was felt in America and among Americans here and elsewhere more than by all the rest of the world. The mails were interrupted, trade was suspended, travel was forbidden, and thousands of Americans found themselves marooned in distant lands. They will be brought home, of course, after they have suffered much delay, loss and distress. The mails may also be carried, with much delay. The interference with commerce cannot be so readily or so fully abated. But the major part of the trouble would not have occurred at all if the American mercantile marine had been commensurate with the requirements of our travel and trade.

Statistics are sometimes dull. Sometimes they are most eloquent. Let us begin by observing that we have in New York the greatest port in the world, reckoned by value of trade; and that of the other four first class ports, one is German, two are English and one is Belgian—all four very directly affected by the war. Here are the figures of their last year's commerce:

New York	$1,966,256,617
Hamburg	1,960,779,855
London	1,866,930,782
Liverpool	1,816,983,279
Antwerp	1,214,725,495

These are the five first class ports. No other in the world reaches the billion-dollar mark. Now let us see what are our imports from and our exports to the principal countries which are or are likely to be involved in this war:

	Imports.	Exports.
Austria-Hungary	$12,960,000	$70,761,000
Belgium	20,016,000	79,869,000
France	83,346,000	172,221,000
Germany	166,626,000	377,464,000
Italy	50,554,000	99,462,000
Netherlands	54,478,000	145,525,000
Russia	9,274,000	45,626,000
United Kingdom	147,150,000	635,085,000

This is a stupendous volume of trade, either for us to enjoy in peace or for us to have interfered with, impaired and demoralized in war. There is, of course, a certain proportion of it which would have to be suspended, as contraband of war. But there is a larger proportion which is not subject to such stoppage, but which should proceed undisturbed and would doubtless do so if it were carried in our own vessels. But because we have so pitifully small a merchant marine of our own, and are therefore dependent upon foreign shipping for the transportation of our own merchandise, that commerce regardless of its contraband or non-contraband character is likely to suffer serious and almost ruinous losses.

VARIANCE IN PROPERTY RIGHTS ON LAND AND SEA.

The basic fault lies, of course, in the persistence of the European powers in maintaining the old discrimination between property rights on land and at sea in time of war. On land private property, industry and trade, if not contraband, are respected and not interfered with. But at sea they are fair game for belligerent seizure. From the earliest times, and consistently and persistently down to the present day, the United States has contended for the enlightened and humane rule that private property at sea should be exempt from seizure, just as on land. That was the contention of Franklin in Revolutionary days, and that was an American contention only the other day in the Hague conference. But the European powers have never agreed to it, and it therefore remains nothing more than a pious aspiration.

The exemption of our commerce, if we had any, would therefore depend upon the principles of neutrality and neutrals' rights, of which also we have for a century and a third been the foremost protagonists. The first important enunciation of neutral rights originated with Frederick the Great of Prussia, and later was made through the mouthpiece of the Russian government in the first armed neutrality, but it did not technically appear in international law until the Declaration of Paris, in 1856. That memorable declaration, by which all European powers are supposed to be bound to-day, was as follows:

1. Privateering is and remains abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.
4. Blockade in order to be binding must be effective.

Now, the United States did not at that time subscribe to that declaration. It was willing to do so with the exception of the first provision. Seeing that it had a comparatively small navy and no enormous mercantile marine, it very logically argued that it would be at a great disadvantage in case of war. Its antagonist, with a far larger navy, could ravage its commerce at will, while this country could not retaliate by commissioning its merchant vessels to act ac privateers.

"Exempt private property at sea from capture," said the United States, "and we will agree to the prohibition of privateering and will sign your declaration."

"No," said Europe, "we want the privilege of looting your commerce if ever we fight you."

So America did not become a party to that declaration then, and was not permitted to enjoy its benefits in 1861, when it wanted to do so in order to preclude European recognition of Confederate privateers. As a result our mercantile marine then vanished from the high seas and has never been restored. However, in 1898 we announced our adherence to all the provisions of the declaration, and that instrument is now recognized international law.

THE QUESTION OF CONTRABAND, AS SETTLED IN 1909.

There next arises the question of contraband, and this was pretty explicitly answered in the Declaration of London, in 1909, to which this country and all the important European powers were parties. The major part of that declaration is about blockades, but the last few sections define contraband. All goods are divided into three classes, thus:

1. Absolute contraband, such as arms and ammunition; goods which are for use solely and exclusively in war or for warlike purposes.

2. Conditional contraband; goods which may be used for either warlike or peaceful purposes. This is the most important class of all, since it includes breadstuffs, meats, forage and all foodstuffs for either men or horses; clothing, specie and paper money, fuel, lubricants, illuminants, etc. Whether these are to be regarded as contraband or not depends partly upon their destination and partly upon the use to which it can be proved they are to be put. But in the vast majority of cases they will be regarded as contraband. Obviously food, clothing, fuel, etc., intended for the use of an army would be contraband. The same things intended for the use of non-combatants would, on the face of the case, seem to be non-contraband. But it would probably be shown that they were being sent to non-combatants in order that the natural supplies of the latter might be sent to the army, and in that case they would be regarded as contraband.

3. Absolutely non-contraband; goods which are not susceptible of being used for warlike purposes. This class includes books, scientific instruments, tools and machinery for the peaceful arts and industries and articles for the use of women and children.

THE RIGHT OF NEUTRALS TO TRADE WITH BELLIGERENTS.

Now, subject to these rules concerning contraband, it is universally conceded that neutrals have an indisputable right to trade with belligerents. The only denial of that right in modern times was during the Napoleonic war, when both England and France were so desperate that they disregarded all laws which hampered them or which gave comfort to their adversary. It will not again be denied, unless to some country which is too weak to maintain it. But in order to enjoy it a country must have a mercantile marine of its own, and that is precisely why the United States is in an unfortunate condition at the present time.

The total tonnage of American shipping is indeed large; perhaps the second largest in the world. But the major part of it is on the Great Lakes and in purely coastwise traffic. In foreign trade our total steam tonnage is pitifully small in comparison with that of other countries. Thus:

United States	895,896
United Kingdom	19,292,770
Germany	4,589,548
Russia	790,075
Austria-Hungary	717,729
Denmark	671,000
Holland	983,049
France	1,500,000
Italy	987,559
Japan	1,140,977
Norway	1,422,006
Sweden	782,508
Spain	746,748

The natural consequence of these conditions is seen in the small figure which American vessels present in the commerce of our own ports. In 1913 the total clearances of American steam vessels in foreign trade from our own seaports were 4,520,697 and of foreign vessels 31,221,160. The clearances of shipping from our ports under the flags of the actual and potential belligerents in the present war were as follows:

	Tons.
Austro-Hungarian	427,246
Belgian	350,231
British	10,359,581
Dutch	1,077,364
French	1,033,963
German	4,587,059
Italian	802,103
Russian	129,935

A list of the great steamship companies of the world, arranged in order of total tonnage, shows that by far the largest is a German line, while another German line is easily second and the next four are British. There are 23 of more than 250,000 tons each, and of these 13 are British, 6 are German, 2 are French, 1 is Japanese, and 1 is an American line on the Great Lakes and therefore not to be reckoned in the commerce of the high seas. In the whole list of 67 companies, all above 100,000 tons each, 35 are British, 10 German, 4 Dutch, 3 French, 2 Japanese, 2 Russian, 2 Austrian, 1 Belgian, 1 Italian, 1 Norwegian, 1 Danish and 5 American, 3 of them being on the Great Lakes.

It is not yet certain to what extent the war will play havoc with the shipping of the belligerents, but it is reasonable to anticipate widespread disturbance, paralysis and destruction of commerce and enormous losses to the mercantile world, including America. The prompt suspension of sailing of Atlantic liners was sufficiently significant of the apprehensions and also of the intentions of the belligerents.

It is also certain that there is in these circumstances an unparalleled opportunity for the United States to acquire for itself the lion's—or the eagle's—share of Atlantic commerce, and indeed of the commerce of the whole world. There was a similar though vastly smaller contingency more than a generation ago. When France and Germany were at war in 1870 President Grant promptly suggested to Congress that sound policy indicated the desirability of some legislation tending to enlarge the commercial marine of this country. "The vessels of this country," he said, "at the present time are insufficient to meet the demands which the existence of war in Europe will impose upon the commerce of the United States, and I submit that the interests of the country will be advanced by the opportunity afforded to our citizens to purchase vessels of foreign construction for the foreign trade of the country."

That was when only two European powers were at war, neither of them the greatest in mercantile marine, and when Great Britain and the Low Countries, with their enormous carrying trade, were neutrals and therefore undisturbed

GERMAN EMPEROR MANOEUVRES OF 1913 INFANTRY ON THE MARCH

Photo by Paul Thompson.



PIPERS OF HIGHLANDERS ALDERSHOT ARMY SPORTS.

Eloquent Figures Adduced by Writer to Point His Argument.

FOOD SUPPLY WAR'S GREAT PROBLEM

By RUTLEDGE RUTHERFORD,
Editor of National Food Magazine.

ALREADY the famine scare has seized parts of Germany and England. France, too, remembering the days of 1871, when meat sold at $20 a pound, is feeling tremulous, and President Poincaré has signed decrees prohibiting the exportation of grains and foodstuffs and extending until August 31 the terms for the payment of obligations due within that time. Similar action has been taken by Germany. In many cities, we read, the food prices have already been trebled.

To England and Germany the problem is of most momentous concern, for these two nations are dependent on the outside world for most of their sustenance. "Starvation, not invasion, is the danger of this country," declared A. J. Balfour several years ago in arguing against the Declaration of London. That declaration will prevent America from contributing prominently to the relief of the war-ridden nations. However, England expects to gain by her treaty with Russia more than she will have lost through the restricted relations with the United States.

It is the most serious problem England has to consider, the continuance of her food supply. With her it is not a question of quality but of quantity. Hence little attention is paid there to the purity of foods. The food laws are lax and inadequately enforced. Chemical preservatives are used freely. A report of the Local Government Board of Scotland shows that of 352 food samples of British origin submitted to chemical analysis 156 were found to contain boron compounds and twelve preservative sulphites.

London, with its environs, has a population of 9,000,000, which receives its sustenance through the London markets and produces no food at all. Not in the present world or in past history is there a situation like this—such a vast assemblage of people huddled together in such a small area on an island and all dependent for their food on outside sources.

This mighty swarm of people consumes each day 5,000,000 loaves of bread, 4,000 tons of potatoes, 350,000 gallons of milk, nearly 1,000,000 cabbages and in season 20,000 pecks of peas and beans. All over the world people are busy growing the grain, raising the cattle, looking after the poultry, catching the fish and tending the fruits and vegetables to keep London and England supplied with their foods from day to day. America has been supplying an enormous proportion of it.

But there must be a great rearrangement of the food avenues. The way to America is long and perilous. This perhaps is the cause of certain articles in the Declaration of London. It helps to explain the cause of England's alliance with Russia soon after the Russo-Japanese War when we found her a firm ally of Japan.

Russia, with her vast area of 8,647,657 square miles, comprising one-sixth of the land surface of the globe, can produce enough food to feed the world, with considerable left over. She imports most of her farm implements from America and is far advanced in agricultural methods—further advanced than any other nation except America. Four-fifths of Russia's population reside in rural districts and engage in agriculture. She exports food products to all the world, our own importations from there amounting to $20,00,000 a year.

With her own self-sustaining resourcefulness Russia depends on no land, and with England's ships to fight for her she will make a formidable foe. France, too, will draw assistance both from England's sea fighting force and from Russia's productiveness. And likewise both nations will realize good results from the alliance with France, which is a country of vast wealth. France is in better financial condition than any other nation in Europe. Her per capita wealth is greater than that of any other nation on earth.

It is true Austria-Hungary is a great food producing country herself, but nothing to compare with Russia. Then the art of agriculture is only poorly developed there. In many parts the people are almost in a state of semi-civilization. Germany's alliance with Austria, like England's with Russia, is for the purpose of assuring a food supply in case of war. Austria-Hungary is Germany's cupboard, and England's is Russia. Germany's cupboard is more accesssible, but less productive. Long Germany has realized her weakness in this respect, and she has taken heroic measures to remedy it. Despite all this, however, with an area of less than 208,780 square miles—less than the State of Texas—Germany has 70,000,000 mouths to feed. What this means can best be understood by comparison with our own country. America, with a population of 90,000,000, has an area of 3,624,022 square miles, or more than seventeen times that of Germany. America has 24-6-7 acres of land to every inhabitant, Germany only 1.9 acres.

But England is far less self-sustaining than Germany. Four-fifths of the wheat consumed in England is supplied from abroad. In seven years the imports of beef and veal rose from 3.31 pounds a head of population to 22.61 pounds. Imports of eggs in the same period rose from 8 to 53 a head. The total expenditure on imported foods amounts to more than $30 a head a year. The figures reach the enormous sum of $1,362,000,000, of which $238,000,000 is for meat of all kinds and $428,000,000 for grain and flour.

GERMAN VIEW OF THE CRISIS

"IF ENGLAND fights with Russia against Germany it will put an end to all peace prospects for centuries to come, no matter who may win. Germans never will forget race treachery."

This is the message which Dr. Ernest D. Richard, of Columbia University, sent last week across the sea to Andrew Carnegie. It embodies his deepest convictions, and they are the convictions also of most persons of German birth or descent in this country. Dr. Richard, who is the author of "A History of German Civilization," and who has a volume on "Modern Germany" in preparation, feels that the American people as a whole do not yet understand the issues involved in the portentous struggle upon which the European nations are entering. He is widely known as an enthusiastic worker for peace, but he does not hesitate to defend and justify the course of the German Emperor in drawing the sword. He declares that Germany would never have gone to war at this time except under the strongest compulsion.

"It is absurd," he says, "to suppose that the Germans want war. Germany was never—not even in the Middle Ages—so prosperous as now. Her great commercial interests give her every reason to wish for peace. The Germans are enraged to think that war is forced upon them. Of one thing you may be sure—if Germany wins the victory it will be the last great conflict."

"But is not the German Emperor mainly responsible for the appeal to arms?" Dr. Richard was asked. "Did Austria declare war on Servia without his knowledge and consent?"

"Yes," was the reply. "But in any case the war was bound to come. The thing was in the air. No one, however, who reads the correspondence between the Kaiser and the Czar can doubt the earnest desire of the former to preserve peace. When Russia went on mobilizing the only thing that Germany could do was to support her ally, Austria. Russia, in fact, was determined on war. For months the Russian press has been filled with hostile comment on Germany and the Germans. In the 'Preussische Jahrbücher' for June, 1914, there is an interesting reply by Paul von Mitranasoff, professor at the imperial Historic-Ethnological Institute of St. Petersburg, to some questions by Dr. Delbrück, the distinguished editor of that periodical, who was Mitranasoff's instructor at the University of Berlin."

These are the points made by Mitranasoff:

"It has become clear to the Russians now that if things remain as they are the way to Constantinople leads through Berlin.

"There is an instinctive antipathy to Germans among the Russian lower classes, and the higher classes (outside of university circles) profess great contempt for German customs and the German language. There is, too, a deeply rooted dislike of the German character."

Commenting on this, Professor Delbrück says: "If Russia takes it as her mission to rule Europe and Asia—well, then, we take it as the mission of Germany to save Europe and Asia from the rule of the Muscovite."

Dr. Richard cites as an illustration of the bitter anti-German feeling in France a declaration in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" of July 18, signed by all the German newspaper correspondents in Paris, complaining of individual insult and persecution. One French editor challenged them all to a duel.

French hatred of Germany is, of course, no new thing. But Dr. Richard sees in the attitude of Russia the chief reason why Germany has had to fight. "The war is, in brief, a great struggle between the Teuton and the Slav," he says. "The idea put forth in some quarters that it is a great struggle between autocracy and democracy is almost too absurd for debate. Russia fighting for democracy! It is the last thing she would fight for. The question before the American people, especially those of Anglo-Saxon traditions, is whether they prefer to have Teutonic or Slavic ideals rule in Europe. If Russia wins in this war she will not stop with the defeat of Germany. Is her ambition to be bounded by Constantinople? Why not take Copenhagen? Why not seize Swedish or Norwegian ports? Russia has long been regarded by Scandinavians as a menace."

"But," it was pointed out, "Germany has been regarded as a menace by more than one nation."

"A menace to whom? The German case, so far as the American people are concerned, is stated in the protest adopted last week by the United German Societies, which I drew up. Let me quote a few sentences from this protest:

"'The attitude of the American press in this matter cannot be a matter of indifference to us, since by it our sympathies and antipathies in the national society of people will be judged. Does the American people desire to give the impression to the world that it is hostile to Germany? Does it want to confirm the Slavs in their hatred, not only of everything German, but of everything Germanic? Do people in America believe that Russia, in case of a victory over the Germans, would stop before the Anglo-Saxons? Do the business men of America see their interest in the friendship of Russia and Servia and the antagonism of Germany and Austria? A glance at the balance should answer this question. . . . We do not demand partiality for Germany and Austria, but we demand fairness toward them, as toward every nation.'

"That is the way the German-Americans feel. Is there anything unfair or unnatural in their attitude?"